Daniel Brown v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-27-2019 
Daniel Brown v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Daniel Brown v. Attorney General United States" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 961. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/961 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1370 
__________ 
 
DANIEL GEORGE BROWN, 
                                                           Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A074-992-221) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter Durling 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 13, 2019 
 
Before:  MCKEE, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 27, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Daniel George Brown, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reopen his removal 
proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition for review in part 
and deny it in part. 
I. 
 Brown is a native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States on 
September 23, 1992, as a non-immigrant with authorization to remain for six months.  
Brown overstayed and was subsequently convicted on April 24, 1995, and June 23, 1995, 
for possession of and intent to deliver/distribute a controlled substance in violation of 35 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16) and (30).  On February 12, 1997, Brown was charged as 
removable under former INA § 241(a)(1)(B) as an overstay, and under former INA §§ 
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) on account of his drug convictions.  The Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) sustained all charges of removability and ordered Brown removed on March 18, 
1997.  Brown declined to apply for relief from deportation and waived his right to an 
appeal to the BIA.  Brown was deported in 1997 and again in 2005 after an illegal 
reentry.  See United States v. Brown, E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 16-cr-00234 (recounting 
history); Brown v. INS, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 02-cv-04600 (same).  
In July 2016, nearly twenty years later, Brown filed a letter with the Immigration 
Court requesting that his case be reopened.  The IJ treated Brown’s letter as a motion to 
reopen proceedings, and denied it.  The IJ concluded that Brown’s motion was untimely 
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filed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  The IJ further found, inter alia, that Brown’s 
motion failed to state any new facts that might be proven at a hearing, was not supported 
by any evidentiary materials as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3), and failed to 
establish prima facie eligibility for relief.  Brown sought review, but the BIA dismissed 
his appeal in a decision issued on March 3, 2017, and reissued on August 15, 2017. 
The BIA affirmed the denial of Brown’s reopen motion for the reasons stated by 
the IJ.  In particular, it agreed that the motion was untimely.  The BIA noted that Brown 
had submitted additional evidence along with an application for cancellation of removal 
under INA § 240A(b).  The BIA concluded, however, that reopening was not appropriate 
because Brown was ineligible for cancellation of removal given his conviction for an 
offense under INA § 237(a)(2), specifically, possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver.1  See A. R. at 4 (citing INA § 240A(b)(1)(C)).  The BIA also concluded 
that Brown did not present an argument warranting the sua sponte reopening of his 
proceedings, and that his reliance on Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), was 
misplaced.  Id. at 5 (citing In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999)).  Finally, the 
BIA determined that the current divisibility analysis of the Pennsylvania statute under 
which Brown was convicted would have no effect on his deportability and ineligibility 
for cancellation of removal in any event. 
                                              
1  The Administrative Record (“A. R.”) has been filed on the docket in a related 
proceeding at C.A. No. 17-2656. 
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 Brown now seeks review of the BIA’s decision. 
II. 
 As an initial matter, we note that the petition for review pertains to the BIA’s 
reissued August 15, 2017 decision only.  To the extent that Brown’s arguments concern 
the underlying March 1997 Order of the IJ, we lack jurisdiction to review those 
contentions.2  As we recently noted in Brown’s appeal challenging the District Court’s 
denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment concerning his latest illegal re-entry 
charge, Brown “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and forfeited his 
opportunity to challenge the validity of the removal order.”  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(d)(1).  Moreover, because Brown is removable for having been convicted of an 
aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense, we retain jurisdiction only to review 
colorable constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); 
Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2010).  “To determine whether a claim is 
colorable, we ask whether ‘it is immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining 
jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 
180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 
(2006)).  We find no merit to any of Brown’s claims. 
                                              
2  It is noted that those same contentions have been previously rejected by this Court.  See 
United States v. Brown, No. 17-3239, 2018 WL 6305835, *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2018). 
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 The BIA denied Brown’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and because 
he failed to establish grounds for sua sponte reopening.  This Court reviews the denial of 
a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Under this standard, the Court may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is 
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and 
must file the motion “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of 
removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Although there is an 
exception to the time and number requirements for motions that seek to apply for asylum 
relying on evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), Brown has never sought asylum.  His reopen motion filed 
nearly two decades after his removal order was issued was clearly untimely. 
As the Government asserts, we generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s 
discretionary decision denying sua sponte reopening.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 
F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  We may, however, consider whether the BIA’s decision 
“is based on a false legal premise.”  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 
2011).  To the extent that Brown’s merits brief could be liberally construed as raising 
such a claim, we conclude that this claim is meritless.  The BIA did not err in stating that, 
even aside from any divisibility analysis with respect to his deportability under former 
INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), Brown remained deportable under 
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former INA § 241(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien convicted of a 
controlled substance violation, and ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 
240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).  For the reasons comprehensively explained 
in the Government’s brief at pages 22 – 26, Brown’s convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 780-113(a)(16) are controlled substance offenses, and at least one of the convictions 
does not involve possession of marijuana for Brown’s personal use, and thus rendered 
him removable.  As the BIA determined, that conviction likewise rendered him ineligible 
for cancellation of removal.  Accordingly, the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua 
sponte discretion was not based on an error of law, and we otherwise lack jurisdiction to 
review the reasoning behind its refusal to reopen Brown’s removal proceedings.3  See 
Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160. 
We therefore will dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part.  
                                              
3 To the extent we have jurisdiction to review Brown’s remaining arguments, they are 
meritless. 
